Public reporting burder for this collection of information is estibated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burder to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
REPORT DATE (DD-
MM
THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF URBANIZATION IN 2020
The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative.
Sun Tzu
Over the next 30 years the world's population is expected to increase by some 2 billion, with most of the increase being absorbed as urban dwellers. Cities will grow larger and more numerous, particularly in the developing world. Conditions for some people will improve as they find shelter, food and work. For the lucky, city life will mean luxury, wealth, opportunity and the good life. For many, however, the result will be overcrowding, hunger, disease and fear. The close juxtaposition of wealth and poverty, of smart suburb and shanty town, of competing cultural and ethnic backgrounds and of the law-abiding and the lawless will inevitably be a cause of friction and conflict. This was ever the case since the start of urban living and the city state, but the coming decades will see the largest growth of urban populations in history.
This scale of urbanization will have an inevitable effect on world order and on the way that nations do business. International relationships will change. This paper will examine the impact of urbanization at the strategic level, in order to have a better understanding of the implications for policy setters and strategic planners, particularly those of the United States and Europe.
Sun Tzu's 1 dictum about not attacking cities is oft quoted, but usually out of context. It is not an isolated statement abjuring urban operations but forms the final part of an articulation of offensive strategy, in which he asserts that the best policy is to take a state intact; to capture an army is better than destroying it; to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill and thus attacking the enemy's strategy is of extreme importance. The next best policy is to disrupt his alliance, then to attack his army and as a last resort, to attack his cities. Cities are costly to attack and wasteful of effort -he advises seeking other strategies. As current events in Baghdad and Basra emphasize, urbanization is undoubtedly a strategic issue, one that will continue to develop in complexity and importance. SCOPE This paper will start by examining the scale of future urbanization. It will then, through the lens of the likely future security environment, assess its strategic impacts using a mix of two analytical models. The first draws on the instruments of national power, viz. diplomacy, information, military force and economic strength. To this will be added elements of the STEPEM paradigm: Societal and Cultural, Technical, Economic, Physical, Ethical, Legal and
Moral and Military. It will draw conclusions and make recommendations about future policy.
Although the urban data on which the paper draws makes predictions that cover the next 30 years, as its title indicates the paper will target the 2020 timeframe. This is far enough off to look beyond today's military and economic programming horizons, which typically look 8 to 10 years out, whilst remaining sufficiently close so as not to fall off the radar screen altogether.
2020 lies within the time span of the U.S. Army and Department of Defense transformation initiatives and is the focus of much of the UK's developmental thinking. This future focus, although drawing on respected academic work, is inevitably based on assumptions and best guesses. Any assessment of the future is just that, an assessment whose accuracy will only become apparent when today's future becomes tomorrow's present and, eventually, its past. As with any assumptions, futurist predictions ought to be challenged and, in time, verified or discarded as necessary.
TERMS
For the sake of clarity, the terms 'city' and 'strategic' as used here should be explained. In discussing urbanization, city will be used to describe all urban agglomerations whose organization is deliberate, even where layout, government and social structure may seem to be chaotic. Thus a city is distinct from a rural collection of dwellers, where there may be a degree of urban terrain, housing and infrastructure but the population is small and rurally focused. Cities are not defined by any formal geographic, administrative, political or historical boundary, but rather by the size of contiguous urban sprawl, which may encompass a number of different named cities and townships, each with their own local government.
Strategic is used in the sense articulated by Art Lykke
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, namely that strategy is the pursuit, protection or advancement of national interests through the application of the instruments of power, viz. political and diplomatic, economic, military and informational. Thus it is not used to represent plans, planning or planners, but appertains specifically to the level of national decision-making.
THE SCALE OF FUTURE URBANIZATION
Undoubtedly one of the major changes taking place in the distribution of the world population over the past two centuries is the concentration of large numbers of people in relatively small, highly urbanized areas known as urban agglomerations. It is, however, only as good as the information it can cull from the world's nations. It is the first to admit that some of its data is not reliable; in particular some of the detail in the assessment of today's city populations may lack robustness. This lack of reliability causes some 4 to doubt its value. However, even were some of its figures unintentionally inflated, the trends that are exposed are still indicative of the sort of future we can expect.
For this study, the UN divides the world into six regions; of these North America and
Europe are categorized as developed, whilst Latin America and the Caribbean (combined into a single region), Asia and Africa are described as developing. Oceania is considered to straddle both categories. Forty nine countries are listed as least developed, of which 34 are in Africa, 9 in Asia, one in the Caribbean and 5 in Oceania. The African figure represents nearly 3 out of every 5 nations in the region. Of today's major hotspots, Europe has the Balkans, while Asia includes the Caucasus, the Middle East and Afghanistan.
GLOBAL TRENDS
Virtually all of the world's population growth from now to 2030 (6.1B increasing to 8.3B) will concentrate in urban areas, taking the urban population from 2.9B to 5.0B. More specifically, this increase will be absorbed by the cities of the less developed regions, whose population will rise from 1.9B to 3.9B. In 2000 47% of the world's population lived in cities. By 2030 that figure will rise to 60%, with the proportion of the world's inhabitants living in urban areas expected to pass the 50% mark for the first time in 2007.
Between 2000 and 2030 the world's urban population is expected to grow by 1.8% per year; in the same period the overall population will increase by an average of only 1%. At that rate the urban population will double in numbers in 38 years. In less developed regions the urban population is growing more quickly, at about 2.3% annually, which will result in a doubling of their urban population in only 29 years. In contrast, the world's rural population figures will remain nearly stable over the next 30 years, growing by only 0.1B to 3.3B, a rate of 0.1%.
The number of rural dwellers in less developed regions rose over the last 50 years to 2.9B, just over doubling. That rate of increase will sharply reduce over the next 20 years, with the rural population only rising to 3.1B; thereafter it is expected to decline, falling to 3B by 2030, only 98M more than today.
CITY ANALYSIS
In assessing the size of cities, urban agglomeration has been used as the basis for measurement, rather than formal city boundaries. Thus the population of Tokyo includes the residents of the contiguous cities of Chiba, Kawasaki and Yokohama. City sizes are categorized as over 10 million inhabitants, known as mega-cities; over 5 million; 1 to 5 million; 500,000 to 1 million; and under 500,000.
In 2000 China (3) Japan (2) China (5) Republic of Korea (1) South-central Asia
Bangladesh (1) India (4) Pakistan (1) Afghanistan (1) Bangladesh (1) India (4) Iran (1) Pakistan (1) South-eastern Asia
Indonesia (1) Philippines (1) Thailand (1) Indonesia (1) Myanmar (1) Vietnam (2
) Western Asia
Turkey (1) Iraq (1 France (1) Germany (1) Caribbean Central America Mexico (1) Colombia (1) Guatemala (1
) South America
Argentina (1) Brazil (2) Brazil (1) Chile (1) Peru (1) Asia and Africa will each have more people living in cities than any of the other regions of the world. The two key factors in the high urban growth rate anticipated in the less developed regions are the migration from rural to urban dwelling and the absorbing of rural settlements into cities. The net effect on the rural population in these areas is a steady decline in numbers similar to that experienced in the developed regions since 1950.
The rapid increase in the world's urban population, together with a steady reduction in its rural dwellers, has led to a major redistribution of population. Relatively speaking, the less well America down to 12.4%, North America down to 6.4% (even though its urban population will grow by 30M souls) and Europe down to 11.7%.
It is interesting to note how the areas from which NATO has drawn its membership (North America, West, North and South Europe) have changed. In 1950, just after the formation of the Alliance, they accounted for 41% of the world's urban and 10% of the rural populations. Today those figures have fallen to 20% and 5%, and in by 2030 are expected to reach 13% and 4%. In terms of influence proportional to world population, it can perhaps be anticipated that, without enlargement, the proportion of the world's inhabitants to whom NATO will have any direct relevance will drastically shrink.
FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
No paper that aims to draw conclusions about the future can do so without making assumptions about the way the world will be. As Charles Dick so succinctly said, predicting the course of two decades is a "dodgy business"
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. Nevertheless it is important to make some predictions, recognize them as the assumptions that they are, and use them to frame any subsequent discussion. This chapter will not attempt to conduct a full predictive analysis from first principles; rather it will draw on work done to underpin the U.S. From the U.S threat perspective, it is broadly agreed that there will not be a rival ideology, nor will there be a rival military coalition. No global military competitor will emerge and although there will be economic competitors, the competition will not lead to war. There will be regional powers that will challenge the U.S militarily, but there is some disagreement over which ones they may be. More states will fail and there will be an increased number of non-state threats to security. On the technology front, advanced military technology will become more diffuse.
Commercial sources will be able to supply significant operational intelligence to those that are willing to pay. Whilst other nations will pursue a revolution in military affairs, the U.S. will retain the overall lead in military technology, with any surprise innovation likely to be developed by the U.S. or one of its allies.
Opposing strategies will have to deal with continuing U.S. control of the seas and the air.
Regional powers will use anti-access and area denial strategies, while any large-scale combat against U.S. forces is likely to include the use of WMD. The U.S. homeland itself will become increasingly vulnerable to asymmetric attack. The last commonly agreed assumption is that information warfare will become increasingly important.
Areas of divergence encompass ideas about the nature of future conflict, threats to the U.S. and views on opposing strategies. These are worth exploring, for some of the more pessimistic views have a bearing on the impact of future urbanization.
When considering the nature of conflict, there is a debate on the likelihood of two major theatre wars (MTW) occurring simultaneously, with 'unlikely' facing off against 'a possibility'.
Whilst some argue that information operations and precision weapons will make warfare 'less lethal', others hold that future wars will be more brutal with more civilian casualties. For some, too, chaos in the littorals or panic in a city are more likely contingencies than MTW, a view not shared by those for whom MTW remains the primary threat to U.S. security. Lastly, space is either a theatre of conflict of the future, or it will remain but a conduit of information and not a combat theatre. As for technology, divergence exists between those for whom the emergence of a near-peer competitor is inevitable, demanding preparation today, and those who see the act of preparing for a near-peer competitor as the catalyst that will create military competition. The security of overseas bases is also a point of contention, centering on the capability of the U.S. to defend them. Dissenting views about opposing strategies focus on anti-access capability, the prominence of the nuclear deterrent and the ability of conventional forces to deter terrorism or non-state actors.
The resulting consensus scenario constructed by the working group required U.S. military 
ASSUMPTIONS
A number of assumptions, both explicit and implicit, fall out of these analyses:
• First, the nation state will continue to be the basis of the international political structure, economic globalization and increasing numbers of non-state actors notwithstanding, although regional boundaries will become increasingly blurred. Over the next twenty years the world's system of governance will not change dramatically or drastically, but will continue to evolve in response to friction and perceived threat.
• Secondly, no major competitor to the U.S. will emerge, military or economic. There will be challenges in both arenas, from individual states, regional groupings and combinations of the two. But, essentially, the world will continue to be uni-polar, with only one super-power. At all but the most local level, political and military competition will be for influence rather than a struggle for territory.
• Causes of tension, friction, clash or conflict will be varied, but in one sense or other will have a root in the difference between those that have and those who have not. Whether water shortage, economic exclusion, energy availability, nationalism or simply struggle for power create the spark, the permanent tensions of unequal distribution, cultural mistrust, ethnic dislike and fear will fan the flame. This will be exacerbated in conditions of dense population already found in many cities and likely to worsen.
• Warfighting will continue to be the essential skill of national armed forces, particularly those of the U.S. and the principal second ranked powers and will remain the most demanding and defining capability. Capabilities based on warfighting render an ability to contribute to other types of operation; the reverse is not true.
• The likelihood of operating in an urban environment will sharply increase. This does not only imply that warfighting will have to develop a greater urban focus; it is an assumption about the whole panoply of military tasks. Crime, particularly organized and transnational, will be a significant factor influencing security concerns.
DIPLOMACY
Diplomacy and politics are recognized together as a major instrument of national power. In the organizers' view, Government policies were increasingly demonstrating an urban bias, with urban views of rural priorities becoming over-dominant. Within the EU, failure to achieve reform of the Common Agricultural Policy arouses annual concern. France, the major beneficiary of the policy, is unwilling (or, perhaps, domestically unable) to agree to change, yet the imminent accession of Poland, with a major agricultural economic dependency, will clearly break the existing scheme.
Arguments between the UK and Spain over fishing quotas are thrashed out many miles from the fishermen whose livelihood depends on the outcome and usually end with governments expressing satisfaction while fishermen from both nations are bitterly disappointed. It is not unreasonable to suppose that increasing urbanization in the less developed world will result, over time, in a similar shift in focus.
Major cities also tend to house the gatherings of national intelligentsia that provide the backbone of the arts, the press and the rest of the media, big business, culture and political intrigue. The resultant intellectual hothouse becomes a center of national attraction, adding to the allure of the city, to the wealth generation it offers and to movement away from the rural life.
Cities become places of great value and of great pride to their citizens; they are often the public face of their nation, absorbing large quantities of national resources. 
INFORMATION
If much has been written on the subject of the impact of urbanization on the informational instrument of power, it is very hard to find. What follows is essentially a hypothesis: that urbanization and information operations are already closely linked, and that future urbanization will only serve to tighten the link and make the acquisition and use of information more difficult.
Urban infrastructure, physical and social, is already complex and difficult to fathom. In the developed world cities will continue to evolve, with regeneration programs, improved transportation, changing lifestyles and pressure on resources tending to make them more sophisticated. This sophistication, technical and cultural, will be reflected in the mass media whose headquarters and audience will remain principally urban. Art, culture, entertainment, access to news and public knowledge will develop positively, at least in quantity if not in taste or quality! Centers of power -political, economic and diplomatic -are unlikely to rusticate themselves; today's urban hotbeds will simply get hotter. The means with which to exercise the informational instrument will develop but not drastically change. Business will continue largely as normal, only better.
In the developing world the picture is not quite the same. At one end, the powerful end, there will be little difference. The ways and means will be just as sophisticated and the social and cultural environments will be just as mature. It is the other end of the social scale that will have changed. Larger numbers, greater poverty, more crowding and greater separation top to bottom are likely to result in sub-cultures forming that will not be responsive to conventional information operations, benign or otherwise. This world will have its own norms, its own means of mass communication and rather different expectations. Cities will continue to have split personalities, leading to potential disconnects between government and people. Major cities that are not seats of government will be even harder to penetrate from an informational perspective.
Even today the citizens of Los Angeles probably view world events through a somewhat different lens than those of Washington, D.C.. The people of Basra appear not to be convinced by the message of friendship aimed at them by Coalition information operations, despite its simplicity, apparent attractiveness and incessant repetition.
The most significant change is likely to rest with the media, who will arguably have developed a more sophisticated and independent real time information gathering capability.
Commercial satellite imagery is already available; whether buying all available bandwidth will remain a feasible counter-policy in 2020 is doubtful. It should be anticipated that global news companies will be flying their own surveillance aircraft with capability at least as good as today's best, reducing the current monopoly enjoyed by the U.S.. Whilst penetration of the urban jungle will be no easier for the media than the military, the media will reach into the darker corners of the city more quickly.
The informational instrument of power will thus become more important over time, as the consequences of exercising the military option become less acceptable to domestic audiences.
This will be especially so in urban areas. The strategic impacts will be both positive and negative; the ability to mount strong information operations and resist those of an adversary will result in explicit strategic advantage. Conversely, the lack of ability to influence or resist influence will severely restrict strategic choice, potentially to the point of strategic paralysis.
THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT
The most demanding, yet probable environment for conflict is likely to be urban. as an effective alternative. Some argue that urban terrain should be avoided, almost at all costs, while others propose new ways of operating. Most of this argument is focused at the tactical level, where the peculiarities of urban terrain demand different techniques than those needed in other complex terrain such as jungle or mountain. An expectation of tactical success is essential if the ability to conduct urban operations is to be considered part of the capability suite of any armed forces.
Whether or not there is an increasing unwillingness of Western publics to accept casualties on the scale of Stalingrad, Berlin or Grozny, there is the very pragmatic problem of reduced numbers of troops available to be able to absorb high casualty rates. Improved technology, reduced strategic threat, pressure on national budgets and the changing expectations of society have caused all NATO countries to cut back the size of their armed forces, especially their land forces. This has not led to acceptance, tacit or otherwise, that operations that in the past demanded massed infantry, for example, are no longer strategic options. On the contrary it has resulted in considerable efforts to improve the tactical capability to engage in combat operations in an urban environment.
The difficulties of the urban canyon
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, with its extra above and below ground dimensions, the difficulty of seeing and communicating and the reduction of area influence by any one man gives momentum to technological and doctrinal development designed to reduce the risk and increase the effectiveness of the combat soldier. This leveling of the tactical playing-field is well recognized and is the subject of considerable development in the U.S., with the USMC as the lead Service. The tactical dilemmas should not be underestimated and tend to dominate development.
At the operational level, the most recent publication of note is the report of NATO's . High on the list are the systems aimed at improving understanding and achieving precision effect; included is a non lethal anti personnel system.
The report also identifies areas in which development of doctrine, organization and training will improve NATO's combined capability. The most significant thrust of recommendations, both organizational and technical, is that means to improve 'understanding' at all levels are the key to successful urban operations in 2020. This focus on knowledge and precision at the operational level is echoed in US development plans. Commander Joint Forces Command has been designated as the Pentagon's Executive Agent for joint urban operations and it is intended to create a Center for Joint Urban Operations this year, whose focus will be at the operational level.
Since the risk is so high, it is worth examining briefly why military operations should be undertaken in urban terrain at all. Arguably there are only three true reasons: the city itself, the population of the city or the action of an adversary:
A Its power sources are a necessity for its inhabitants yet probably vital to the successful prosecution of Iraqi defense. Destruction of its water distribution system will have a major effect on its non-combatant population and may therefore not be politically acceptable. A stated objective of regime change implies that the Allies would need to demonstrate that they are in charge of the capital city, which means military occupation for a short while at least. Whether an alternative government could be successfully established outside Baghdad, even with the current regime demonstrably overthrown, is debatable, but ought to be considered strategically as an option.
The population of a city may provide the second reason for military operations in urban areas, to be either defended or liberated. It need not be the whole population that drives an operation which might range from small scale non-combatant evacuation through defense of an oppressed minority to providing a secure environment for post-conflict restoration to be affected. These three considerations should be seen as strategic rather than operational in nature, for they are indicative of the intent behind the use the military instrument of power. Each of them, too, is susceptible to pressure applied any of the instruments of national power.
ECONOMIC POWER
In strategic terms, what are the economic impacts of future urbanization likely to be?
Economic power is already centered in cities, in both developed and developing worlds. Of all the instruments of power, the economic is the hardest to exploit in an exclusive way. Financial tendrils encircle the globe today; economic interdependence is the norm. The U.S., for all its power, is economically dependent on oil suppliers, external raw material sources and outside Economic pressure has long been a strategic tool, from simple blockade to complex sanctions such as those applied to Iraq. But, as the Iraqi subvention of the means and intent of those sanctions demonstrates, the instrument has limitations. In urban areas it is reasonable to imagine that, as sanctions bite, the effects are first felt by the poorer and least able to resist rather than by the ruling class against whom the measures are primarily directed. The expectation is perhaps that sufficient deprivation will induce the under-privileged to revolt, changing its leadership to one more open to economic persuasion. The reality is more often, as in Iraq, that tyrannical hold outlasts economic privation.
The economic instrument is arguably more effective when giving rather than withholding.
Financial incentives are frequently more effective that economic or military threats, particularly when trying to secure alliance, co-operation or even just agreement not to interfere. At the strategic level, the economic instrument is directed at regimes and their national interests and
should not be confused with aid, humanitarian or otherwise. In that regard, increasing urbanization is unlikely to change the perceived value, the validity or the viability of economic pressure to any great extent. The scale of effect of the use of economic power in 2020 is likely to vary according to the same parameters as it does today -the availability of national resources, the attractiveness of economic blandishments to the target audience and the range of alternatives.
CONCLUSIONS
The change in global urbanization over the next 20 years is a serious issue that deserves attention from national policy makers. The scale, particularly in the developing world, will affect political and cultural climates. Increasing urban density, overcrowding and the shift from rural to urban living will put pressure on already scarce resources. This will lead to greater friction, the right conditions for conflict to erupt and the opportunity for catastrophic failure of city or state. In the developed world, the relatively static state of urban development suggests that an equilibrium has been found between urban and rural dwelling. Some degree of urban renewal can be expected and it is not unreasonable to expect urban life to increase in complexity and sophistication. Change will be gradual in the developed world but rapid elsewhere. Unless close attention is paid and due precaution observed, western decision makers risk being strategically constrained in their choice of instrument.
The impacts on the diplomatic, informational and economic instruments of national power are not dramatic, but rather indicate a steadily deepening complexity, with ever more interdependence between them. Continuing globalization will continue to be energized from within great cities as well as national capitals and will serve to make strategic decisions more complex, with greater difficulty in defining, separating and pursuing national interests.
Diplomacy will remain a major instrument and will still be exercised principally in cities, at the centers of national and international power. Information will remain critical. As cities become larger and more complex, so total knowledge will be harder to extract. Target audiences for national information campaigns will not change very much in nature, as power centers will not move, but getting the message to the general populace will have a new dimension.
It is on the freedom to use the military instrument that the greatest impact will be felt.
Urban combat, already difficult, will take place in denser, more complex terrain, with a greater number of non-combatants present and under the full glare of the world's media. Changing social norms will continue to restrict developed countries' willingness to take casualties.
Improved tactical capability and better operational understanding will make strategic decisions easier. Some of this increase in capability will come from better equipment, sharper precision and innovative doctrine. The need for nation building and law enforcement capability, neither of which are traditional military tasks, will also complicate the military option.
Based on what we are seeing in Iraq, that experience will reinforce perceptions that the way to negate technological military superiority is by forcing such opponents into urban combat, either to impose a military defeat or, more likely, to add pressure to an informational and diplomatic effort to relieve overwhelming military pressure. With increasing urbanization in those areas of the world most likely to be the scene of future conflict, the U.S. and the West must retain the capability and will to be successful in applying all its elements of national power, especially the military, in cities.
Perhaps the last word in considering the impact of urbanization on strategic choice should rest with General Charles Krulak, Commandant of the U.S Marine Corps:
"The future is not the son of Desert Storm but the stepchild of Somalia and Chechnya." WORD COUNT = 7807
